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Abstract 
A conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) 
concept for the terminal maneuvering area (TMA) 
was evaluated in a fast-time batch simulation study at 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Langley Research Center.  The CD&R 
concept is being designed to enhance surface 
situation awareness and provide cockpit alerts of 
potential conflicts during runway, taxi, and low 
altitude air-to-air operations.  The purpose of the 
study was to evaluate the performance of aircraft-
based CD&R algorithms in the TMA, as a function of 
surveillance accuracy.  This paper gives an overview 
of the CD&R concept, simulation study, and results. 
Introduction 
The Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen) concept for the year 2025 and beyond 
envisions the movement of large numbers of people 
and goods in a safe, efficient, and reliable manner 
[1].  NextGen will remove many of the constraints in 
the current air transportation system, support a wider 
range of operations, and provide an overall system 
capacity up to three times that of current operating 
levels.  Emerging NextGen operational concepts [2], 
such as four-dimensional trajectory based airborne 
and surface operations, equivalent visual operations, 
and super density arrival and departure operations, 
require a different approach to air traffic management 
and as a result, a dramatic shift in the tasks, roles, and 
responsibilities for the flight deck and air traffic 
control (ATC) to ensure a safe, sustainable air 
transportation system. 
The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) is conducting research to 
develop technologies, data, and guidelines to enable 
aircraft-based conflict detection and resolution 
(CD&R) in the terminal maneuvering area (TMA) 
under current and emerging NextGen operating 
concepts providing an additional, protective safety 
layer for NextGen operations in the event that the 
tactical or strategic situation awareness is not 
sufficient or human errors or blunders occur.  The 
CD&R concepts use cockpit display designs to 
promote surface situation awareness and associated 
flight deck alerting concepts for safety assurance.  
The concepts employ continual own-ship and traffic 
data monitoring and algorithms to detect conflicts on 
the runway, at low altitudes near the airport, and 
during taxi and ramp operations for multiple classes 
of aircraft and surface vehicles.  Alerts are generated 
as necessary and appropriate when traffic could affect 
runway safety or other TMA operational conditions 
that may require flight crew response. 
Although substantial NASA research and testing 
has been conducted in the areas of surface operations 
situation awareness and runway incursion CD&R [3, 
4, 5, 6], much of this research has been conducted 
with a human-in-the-loop and has not included the 
effect of navigation accuracy and CD&R system 
equipage levels on CD&R performance. 
A fast-time batch simulation study was 
conducted to evaluate the performance of aircraft-
based CD&R algorithms in the TMA, with variations 
in surveillance accuracy.  The algorithms were 
evaluated under various runway, taxiway and low 
altitude scenarios, multiple levels of CD&R system 
equipage, and various levels of horizontal position 
accuracy.  CD&R performance was assessed through 
various metrics including the frequency of collisions 
and near-collisions and nuisance and missed alerts.  
This paper presents an overview of the CD&R 
concept, description of the test method, and study 
results. 
System Description 
Simulation Tool 
A simulation tool, known as Traffic Manager 
(TMX), was utilized for this study.  TMX is a 
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desktop simulation application designed for 
interaction studies of aircraft in present or future Air 
Traffic Management environments [7].  TMX can 
serve as a stand-alone traffic simulator, scenario 
generator, scenario editor, experiment control station, 
data recording tool, and rapid prototyping 
environment and can operate in real-time or fast-time 
mode.  For this study, TMX was used in fast-time 
mode simulating various approach, departure, and 
taxi scenarios at the Chicago O’Hare International 
(KORD) airport.  Although TMX is capable of 
simulating up to 2,000 aircraft simultaneously, only 
two aircraft per scenario were simulated.  Each 
aircraft used a six-degree-of-freedom dynamics 
model. 
Some modifications were made to TMX for this 
study.  These included: 1) an updated database for the 
KORD airport; 2) creation of a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) sensor model for position accuracy; 3) 
creation of an interface to the CD&R algorithm; 4) 
expansion of the pilot model to handle the required 
taxi, runway, and low altitude maneuvers; and 
various other minor modifications. 
Surveillance Data 
Traffic data are integral to the CD&R concepts.  
For this study, it was assumed that Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) would 
be used as the means for transmitting (ADS-B Out) 
and receiving (ADS-B In) aircraft surveillance data.  
ADS-B transmissions followed RTCA DO-242A 
specifications [8]; however, some simplifications 
were made to minimize computational overhead, 
such as not implementing models for latency effects 
and transmission line-of-sight and bandwidth 
blockage.  For state-vector messages, a 1 Hz data 
transmission rate was specified.  The position 
accuracy depended on the GPS measurement errors 
including a bias and an instantaneous jitter.  A Gauss-
Markov process was used to model the time 
correlation between successive position measurement 
errors [9]. 
Navigation Accuracy Category for Position 
(NACp) describes the accuracy of positional 
information.  NACp values range from 0 to 11 [8].  
The horizontal Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU) 
values for NACp categories of 8 and higher are listed 
in Table 1. 
Table 1.  NACp 
NACp 95% Horizontal Accuracy Bound (EPU) 
8 EPU < 92.6 m (0.05 nm, 305.6 ft) 
9 EPU < 30 m (99 ft) 
10 EPU < 10 m (33 ft) 
11 EPU < 3 m (9.9 ft) 
 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 
issued an ADS-B Out Final Rule [10] which includes 
performance standards for ADS-B Out.  The Rule 
states that EPU must be less than 0.05 nautical miles 
(nm), which is equivalent to NACp 8. 
Irrespective of this rule, Safety, Performance 
and Interoperability Requirements (SPR) for the 
Implementation of Enhanced Traffic Situational 
Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications 
and Alerts (ATSA SURF IA) have proposed 
horizontal position accuracy requirements (RTCA 
SC-186 [11]).  Through analysis, the SPR identified 
that to meet safety requirements, horizontal position 
accuracy on the airport surface needs to be at least 10 
m within 95% containment bounds (NACp 10) to 
allow indications and alerts at virtually all airports in 
the National Airspace System.  Validation of these 
requirements is on-going. 
Based on the ADS-B Out Final Rule and SURF 
IA requirements, NACp values of 8, 9, 10, and 11 
were evaluated for this study.  Truth data, with no 
accuracy errors, was also evaluated. 
Conflict Detection 
CD&R Algorithm 
The Airport Traffic Collision Avoidance 
Monitor (ATCAM) CD&R algorithm was designed 
to identify potential traffic conflicts at low altitudes 
near the airport, on the runway, and during taxi and 
ramp operations for multiple classes of aircraft and 
surface vehicles. 
ATCAM is comprised of three separate aircraft-
based algorithms that rely on traffic state information 
obtained from ADS-B In: 
1.  The Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) is 
designed to detect and alert for runway conflicts.  
RSM monitors own-ship and traffic located in a 
three-dimensional virtual zone around the relevant 
runway using own-ship and traffic state data and 
separation and closure rate to determine whether an 
alert should be generated.  RSM is described in detail 
in [12]. 
2.  The Low Altitude Conflict Monitor (LACM) 
is designed to detect and alert for air-to-air conflicts 
near the airport at altitudes below 1000 ft (i.e., to not 
conflict with the Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS)).  LACM computes 
closing speed, time to closest point of approach 
(CPA), time to co-altitude, and other data between 
own-ship and approaching aircraft to determine if 
criteria and thresholds are met for issuing alerts, 
similar to the TCAS approach. 
3.  The Taxi Conflict Monitor (TCM) is 
designed to detect and alert for ground taxi conflicts 
in the airport movement areas.  The TCM design is 
similar to that of LACM and computes distances 
between own-ship and traffic, closing speeds, time to 
CPA and other parameters. 
The three algorithms are independent but are 
integrated and share data to increase the probability 
of detection for all possible conflicts during airport 
TMA operations.  RSM has been through extensive 
testing [3, 4, 5, 6].  LACM and TCM are less mature 
but have been evaluated in simulation studies [13, 
14].  Green, et al [15] provides a detailed description 
of ATCAM including initial alerting criteria. 
Alerts 
Alerts identify potential collision hazards which 
may require timely response by the flight crew to 
avoid a collision.  A two-level alerting scheme is 
employed. 
Caution alerts are generated for conditions that 
require immediate flight crew awareness and 
subsequent flight crew response.  Generally, caution 
alerts are generated with sufficient time to evaluate 
the situation to be prepared to respond. 
Warning alerts are generated for conditions that 
require immediate flight crew awareness and 
immediate flight crew response.  Warning alerts may 
occur without preceding caution alerts. 
The application of these alerts within the cockpit 
follows FAA Advisory Circular 25.1322-1. 
Test Method 
Data collection occurred for runway, taxi, and 
low altitude air-to-air conflict scenarios.  Only two 
aircraft were included in each scenario to limit the 
interaction in this initial fast-time study.  For ease of 
discussion, the aircraft will be referred to as Aircraft 
A and Aircraft B. 
CD&R Equipage 
Various levels of CD&R system equipage were 
simulated for this study: a) both aircraft equipped; b) 
neither aircraft equipped; or, c) one or the other 
aircraft equipped. 
When an aircraft was not equipped, it would 
follow its planned flight path to the end of the test 
run.  When an aircraft was equipped, it would take 
action after a warning alert was generated by 
following an appropriate maneuver (e.g. go-around, 
abort, stop), depending on the operational phase.  The 
maneuver was based on the relative location of the 
aircraft at the projected CPA. 
Test Scenarios 
Seven runway, three taxiway, and two low 
altitude air-to-air scenarios were developed.  
Variability was introduced into the scenarios by 
varying the location of the aircraft, speed of the 
aircraft, and/or time when the aircraft started to 
proceed along its predefined route.  As a result, not 
every test run resulted in a conflict or collision.  Due 
to space limitations, only two scenarios are reported 
in this document. 
Runway Scenario – Arrival with taxi crossing 
This scenario evaluated the situation where an 
aircraft was on approach when another aircraft taxied 
perpendicular across the runway. 
The initial condition (IC) for Aircraft A was at 
3.5 nm from the threshold at 1110 ft above field level 
(AFL) at an indicated airspeed of 138 kt.  Aircraft A 
flew at a constant altitude to intercept the glideslope 
at 3.3 nm from the threshold and then descended on a 
3 degree glidepath for a straight-in approach to 
Runway 10.  For the nominal flight plan, Aircraft A 
landed, decelerated at 2.5 m/s, taxied down the 
runway at 60 kt, and then slowed to exit the runway 
at Taxiway M7 at 3 kt.  Aircraft B started at various 
locations around Runway 10 and taxied across 
starting from a complete stop and accelerating at 1 
m/s/s to 15 kt.  The actual taxiways for KORD were 
not used in this study.  Instead, Aircraft B’s initial 
position was placed at 14 different locations along 
the length of Runway 10 (0, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 
3000, 3500, 4000, 4500, 5000, 6000, 7500, 9000, and 
10,000 feet from the runway threshold) simulating 
various taxiway entry points and at 18 locations away 
from the runway (300, 320, 340, 360, 380, 400, 450, 
500, 550, 600, 650, 700, 800, 900, 1,000, 1,200, 
1,400, and 1,600 feet from the runway centerline) – 
see Figure 1.  Aircraft B (red chevron, Figure 1) 
began to taxi when Aircraft A (blue chevron, Figure 
1) was at various points in its approach and rollout 
(from 3.5 nm to the glidepath intercept point on the 
runway, at 0.5 nm intervals, crossing the runway 
threshold, glidepath aimpoint (1000 ft), and 3000 ft, 
4500 ft, 1 nm, 8000 ft, and 9000 ft past the 
threshold).  If maneuvering were required based on a 
CD&R warning alert being triggered in an 
appropriately equipped aircraft, Aircraft A would 
conduct a go-around if above 70 ft AFL; otherwise, it 
would continue to land and stop on the runway.  
Aircraft B, if equipped, would stop if its nose had not 
reached the runway shoulder (greater than 100 ft 
from the runway centerline) at the projected stopping 
point; otherwise, it would continue to taxi across the 
runway.  When conducting an emergency stop by 
either aircraft, a 4 m/s/s deceleration rate was used. 
Taxi Scenario – Taxi intersection 
This scenario tested the situation where aircraft 
conflict at a perpendicular taxiway intersection.  
Aircraft A began taxi at 15 kt.  Aircraft B taxied 
across the taxiway, starting from a complete stop and 
accelerating to 15 kt at 1 m/s/s.  Aircraft B’s initial 
position was placed at 4 different locations along 
Aircraft A’s taxiway (400, 600, 800, and 1,000 feet 
ahead of Aircraft A) simulating various taxiway 
crossing points and at 5 locations away from the 
taxiway (230, 380, 530, 680, and 830 feet from 
taxiway centerline) – see Figure 2.  Aircraft B began 
to taxi when Aircraft A was at various locations 
along the taxiway (0, 150, 300, 450, and 600 ft from 
its starting position).  If a warning alert was triggered 
on an equipped aircraft, the aircraft would stop at an 
accelerated rate (4 m/s/s) provided that it could be 
determined that the aircraft’s nose location was 
greater than 100 ft from the intersecting taxiway 
centerline at the projected stopping point; otherwise, 
it would continue to taxi across the taxiway. 
Pilot Reaction Delay 
A delay was incorporated to simulate the 
reaction time from when a pilot would receive a 
warning alert until action was taken to resolve the 
situation.  The following delay times were used for 
this study:  5 seconds (sec) when aircraft was on 
approach, 3 sec when aircraft was rolling out, and 2 
sec during taxi.  These delay times were selected 
based on reaction delays experienced during previous 
piloted simulation and flight testing. 
Test Matrix 
CD&R algorithm performance was evaluated for 
the conflict scenarios described above using the 
ATCAM CD&R algorithm for five levels of 
surveillance accuracy (NACp of 8, 9, 10, 11, and 
truth), and four levels of CD&R system equipage 
(neither aircraft equipped, only Aircraft A equipped, 
only Aircraft B equipped, and both aircraft 
equipped). Thus, 20 cases were examined for each of 
the scenarios. 
The number of replicates for each treatment 
combination varied according to level of surveillance 
accuracy.  As shown in Table 2, more replicates were 
conducted for the lower NACp values in order to 
increase the level of precision for estimating the true 
location of the aircraft. 
Table 2.  Number of Replicates 
NACp Number of replicates 
8 7 
9 6 
10 4 
11 3 
Truth 1 
 
Some of the test conditions from Figures 1 and 
2, in which a conflict would obviously not occur, 
were omitted in order to reduce the size of the test 
matrix. 
Data were collected for the test runs in random 
order by scenario.  For data manageability of the 
scenarios that required a large number of test runs, 
data were collected randomly grouped by level of 
surveillance accuracy and CD&R system equipage. 
 Figure 1.  Runway Scenario – Arrival with Taxi Crossing Initial Conditions 
 
 
Figure 2.  Taxi Scenario – Taxi Intersection Initial Conditions 
Test Metrics 
Some of the metrics utilized for this study are 
defined in this section.  All data is referenced from 
the aircraft center-of-gravity (CG), unless noted 
otherwise. 
Near-Collision / Collision 
For the runway scenario, a near-collision was 
counted if the CG’s of the two aircraft were < 300 ft 
apart laterally and vertical separation was < 200 ft.  A 
collision was counted if the aircraft CG’s were < 150 
ft apart laterally and vertical separation was < 100 ft. 
For the taxiway scenario, a near-collision was 
counted if the aircraft CG’s were < 185 ft apart 
laterally.  A collision was counted if the aircraft CG’s 
were < 150 ft apart laterally. 
Nuisance / Missed Alerts 
According to the SURF IA SPR [11], a nuisance 
alert is defined as any alert generated by a properly 
functioning CD&R system that is inappropriate or 
unnecessary for the particular situation.  Nuisance 
alerts could distract the flight crew unnecessarily, 
reduce confidence in the system, and negatively 
affect safety and operational effectiveness.  Repeated 
nuisance alerts could decrease the use of CD&R and 
reduce expeditious flight crew response to true alerts. 
A missed alert is defined as a failure to provide 
an alert when it is necessary provided own-ship and 
traffic are adequately equipped [11].  Missed alerts 
represent a reduction in CD&R benefits. 
The SURF IA SPR [11] definitions for nuisance 
and missed boundaries were applied.  Horizontal 
position error was the only source of error modeled.  
Other sources of error, such as vertical position error, 
airport database error and flight technical error, were 
not included. 
For the runway scenario, the following nuisance 
and missed boundary definitions applied for Aircraft 
A: 
 When the aircraft was on approach, an approach 
corridor as defined in the SURF IA SPR for 
NACp 8 with a probability of missed alert of 
0.01 was used since NACp 8 and higher was 
being evaluated.  The corridor width was +/- 
321.5 ft at the runway threshold and linearly 
increased to +/- 964.6 ft at 3 nm away from the 
runway threshold.  The nuisance boundary 
definition was when the true aircraft position 
was outside the approach corridor, but the 
detected position was within the approach 
corridor.  The missed boundary definition was 
when the aircraft’s true position was within the 
approach corridor, but the detected position was 
outside the approach corridor.  Since the true 
position of the approach aircraft tracked the 
extended runway centerline, the aircraft could 
never enter the nuisance boundary. 
 When the aircraft had crossed the runway 
threshold on landing or was traveling along a 
runway, the nuisance boundary definition was 
when the aircraft’s true position was farther than 
one runway width (150 ft) from the runway 
centerline, but the detected position was within 
one runway width of the centerline.  The missed 
boundary definition was when the aircraft’s true 
position was within one runway width of the 
runway centerline, but the detected position was 
greater than one runway width from the 
centerline. 
For the runway scenario, the following nuisance 
and missed boundary definitions applied for Aircraft 
B: 
 When the aircraft was taxiing across the runway, 
the nuisance boundary definition was when the 
true position of the aircraft’s nose (when 
entering) or tail (when exiting) was at or behind 
the hold line, but any part of the detected aircraft 
(from nose to tail) was between the runway 
shoulder edges.  The missed boundary definition 
was when the true position of any part of the 
aircraft was between the runway shoulder edges, 
but the detected nose position (when entering) 
or tail position (when exiting) was outside of the 
runway shoulder edges.  A shoulder width of 7.5 
m (25 ft), as defined in the SURF IA SPR for 
Aerodrome code 4, was used.  A 150 ft wide 
runway was assumed; therefore, the distance 
between shoulder edges was approximately 200 
ft.  The hold line was located 225 ft from the 
runway centerline. 
For the taxi scenario, the following nuisance and 
missed boundary definitions applied for both aircraft: 
 When the aircraft was traveling along the 
taxiway, the nuisance boundary definition was 
when the true position was farther than one 
taxiway width (75 ft) from the taxiway 
centerline, but the detected position was within 
one taxiway width of the taxiway centerline.  
The missed boundary definition was when the 
true position was within one taxiway width of 
the taxiway centerline, but the detected position 
was greater than one taxiway width from the 
taxiway centerline.  Since the true position of 
both aircraft during taxi tracked their respective 
taxiway centerlines, the aircraft could never 
enter the nuisance boundary. 
 When the aircraft was crossing at a taxiway 
intersection, the nuisance boundary definition 
was when the true position of the nose (when 
entering) or tail (when exiting) was at or behind 
the taxiway holding position (assumed for this 
study to be 129.5 ft from crossing taxiway 
centerline [17]), but any part of the detected 
aircraft (from nose to tail) was determined to be 
between the taxiway shoulder edges.  A 
shoulder width of 25 ft was used [18].  The 
missed boundary definition was when the true 
position of any part of the aircraft was 
determined to be between the taxiway shoulder 
edges, but the detected nose position (when 
entering) or tail position (when exiting) was 
outside of the taxiway shoulder edges. 
Since only true vertical position was used, there 
was no opportunity for a nuisance or missed 
condition in the vertical direction. 
An alert was considered to be a nuisance if the 
alert was generated when the aircraft was within a 
nuisance boundary, based on the definitions above. 
A straight-forward corollary for a missed alert 
definition does not exist.  If the aircraft was within 
the missed boundary, based on the definitions above, 
and an alert was not generated, that did not 
necessarily mean that an alert should have been 
generated.  Even though one of the aircraft was in the 
missed boundary, the geometry of the aircrafts’ 
trajectory may not be on a collision path.  Therefore, 
if an alert was generated when using truth data but an 
alert was not generated at the same instance when 
using NACp data, then a missed alert was counted.  
This definition is algorithm dependent. 
Unwanted Alert 
This metric was developed as an effort to 
determine how far an alert zone should be from the 
hold line so unwanted (i.e. nuisance) alerts do not 
occur when an aircraft is preparing to cross the 
runway but is still behind the hold line.  The edge of 
the alert zone was placed at the same location as the 
hold line (225 ft from the runway centerline) so an 
alert would be generated the moment the aircraft 
crossed the hold line.  An alert was considered 
unwanted if the true aircraft position was behind the 
hold line but the detected position indicated the 
aircraft to be over the hold line, causing an alert.  If 
an unwanted alert was triggered, the maximum 
distance the detected aircraft nose crossed over the 
hold line was recorded, thus approximating the 
distance the alert zone should be from the hold line. 
Results 
A summary of quantitative results is presented.  
All data is referenced from the aircraft CG, unless 
noted otherwise.  For the aircraft used in this study, 
the nose position was 72.8 ft from the CG and the tail 
position was 82 ft from the CG. 
For each scenario, the data analysis was limited 
to the area of interest, i.e., until the aircraft reached 
the CPA or until 10 seconds after a warning alert 
terminated, whichever was later.  Also, both aircraft 
broadcasted the same level of positional accuracy for 
each test run. 
Results are tabulated for NACp 8 to 11 and true 
position accuracy; however, the discussion of NACp 
8 statistical results is limited due to poor performance 
based on positional error.  The Kruskal-Wallis test 
was utilized to provide a non-parametric statistical 
hypothesis test to detect differences in NACp 
accuracy and CD&R equipage using a significance 
level of α = 0.05 and N = number of test runs.  When 
statistically significant differences were detected, 
post-hoc analysis was conducted using the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test. 
Runway Scenario – Arrival with taxi crossing 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, 2,367 
combinations of the initiation delay and initial 
position for Aircraft B (taxiing aircraft) were 
evaluated, for a total of 198,828 test runs. 
Algorithm performance – The data (Table 3) 
shows that warning alerts were generated on 
approximately 50% of the runs for either aircraft, 
almost independent of the NACp levels.  Caution 
alerts were issued on approximately 50% of the runs 
for the taxiing aircraft (Aircraft B) but only 20% of 
the time for the approach aircraft (Aircraft A).  
Caution alerts are issued on approach when the 
aircraft is 8,000 ft to 6,000 ft from the runway 
threshold.  During a higher percentage of test runs, 
the alerting criteria was not met until the aircraft was 
less than 6,000 ft from the runway threshold on 
approach or on the runway after landing, within the 
warning alert zone.  The number of caution alerts for 
NACp 9 accuracy was statistically different from 
NACp 10, 11 and truth accuracies over all equipage 
levels.  There was no statistical difference between 
accuracy levels when analyzing the number of 
warning alerts over all equipage levels. 
Alert toggling occurred when multiple instances 
of caution and warning alerts were generated during a 
test run.  Alert toggling is undesirable (i.e., it is a 
distraction to the flight crew and would cause 
mistrust in the technology). 
As the position accuracy was reduced, alert 
toggling occurred more frequently, particularly for 
NACp 8 and 9 accuracies (see Table 3).  The number 
of multiple caution and warning alerts for NACp 9 
accuracy was statistically different from NACp 10 
and 11 and truth accuracy over all equipage levels.  
This toggling included gaps between alerts in many 
instances.  In addition to position accuracy, the 
toggling can also be a result of aircraft maneuvering.  
It should be noted that for Aircraft B, toggling 
occurred when accurate (true) position data was 
transmitted, which was not expected.  It was 
determined that these multiple alerts were generated 
after Aircraft B had crossed Runway 10 and was 
entering a nearby runway.  Alerts should not have 
been generated in this situation because there was not 
a traffic threat on the nearby runway. 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of 
runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed 
and nuisance boundaries increased as the position 
accuracy decreased, as shown in Table 4.  Aircraft 
can cross into the missed and nuisance boundary 
multiple times throughout a test run, for varying 
lengths of time.  The number of times (count) and 
amount of time (duration and percentage of run 
length) that the aircraft were within the boundaries 
was greater when using less accurate data (see Table 
4).  Although there was no statistical difference 
between accuracy levels for the number of times 
entering the missed and nuisance boundary across 
equipage levels, this trend was particularly evident 
when using NACp 8 accuracy. 
For the approach aircraft (Aircraft A), the 
majority of occurrences of entering the missed 
boundary was after the aircraft had crossed the 
runway threshold for landing.  The aircraft only 
entered the missed boundary while on approach 
before crossing the runway threshold during 2.8% of 
the test runs when using NACp 8 accuracy.  Since 
Aircraft A tracked the extended centerline on 
approach and centerline after landing, the nuisance 
Table 3.  Alert Statistics by Aircraft for Arrival / Taxi Crossing Runway Scenario 
 
 
NACp 
 
Total # 
Runs 
 
Caution Alerts 
(% runs) 
Multiple Caution 
Alerts 
(% runs) 
 
Warning Alerts 
(% runs) 
Multiple Warning 
Alerts 
(% runs) 
Aircraft A 
8 66,276 29.84   3.86 50.51 15.74 
9 56,808 19.88   1.10 45.54   3.53 
10 37,872 16.22   0.01 44.34   1.14 
11 28,404 16.18   0.01 44.03   0.50 
Truth  9,468 16.14   0.00 43.94    0.00 
Aircraft B 
8 66,276 57.75 19.44 44.36 17.64 
9 56,808 46.19   2.94 48.43   5.56 
10 37,872 43.34   1.81 47.55   2.17 
11 28,404 43.08   1.92 47.64   1.69 
Truth  9,468 43.05   1.96 47.69   1.35 
Table 4.  Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics by Aircraft for Arrival / Taxi Crossing Runway 
Scenario 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# runs, 
% runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length
# runs, 
% runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length
Aircraft A 
8 54221,  81.8   6.6,    3.9 11.4,   11.9 7.8    377,   0.6   1.1,    0.9   0.6,    0.2 0.3 
9      662,  1.2   1.6,    1.1   1.4,     1.6 0.8    335,   0.6   1.0,    1.0   0.6,    0.2 0.2 
10      149,  0.4   1.0,    1.0   0.5,     0.3 0.2    136,   0.4   1.0,    0.0   0.4,    0.2 0.2 
11        63,  0.2   1.0,    0.0   0.2,     0.1 0.1      64,   0.2   1.0,    0.0   0.2,    0.1 0.1 
Truth          0,  0.0   0.0,    0.0      0,     0.0 0.0        0,   0.0   0.0,    0.0      0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B 
8 47923,  72.3   2.0,    1.6   4.1,   2.9 3.6 19801,  29.9   3.6,    1.7   6.5,    9.6 5.6 
9 34867,  61.4   1.3,    1.1   1.5,   1.2 1.3       87,    0.2   1.7,    0.9   1.3,    1.8 1.1 
10 20852,  55.1   1.1,    1.0   0.6,   0.3 0.5         0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0      0,    0.0 0.0 
11 10090,  35.5   1.1,    1.0   0.3,   0.1 0.2         0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0      0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth         0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0      0,   0.0 0.0         0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0      0,    0.0 0.0 
 
boundary was entered as the aircraft was exiting the 
runway. 
The taxiing aircraft (Aircraft B) entered the 
missed boundary at least once for a high percentage 
of the test runs for accuracy levels of NACp 8 to 11.  
This was due to the criteria for entering the missed 
boundary.  The aircraft was counted as entering the 
missed boundary when the true position of any part 
of the aircraft was determined to be between the 
runway shoulder edges, but the detected nose 
position (when entering) or tail position (when 
exiting) was outside of the runway shoulder edges.  
As such, there was no buffer between when the 
aircraft was inside or outside the missed boundary so 
a measurable difference between the true and 
detected position could cause a missed boundary to 
be counted. 
The number of test runs that contained missed 
and nuisance alerts was relatively low, overall, as 
shown in Table 5.  The missed alert definition, as 
noted earlier, is algorithm dependent.  Missed alerts 
for both aircraft were highest when using NACp 8 
accuracy.  There was no statistical difference 
between accuracy levels when analyzing missed 
caution alerts and missed warning alerts over all 
equipage levels.  Aircraft A did, however, experience 
two missed alerts under the truth accuracy condition.  
This unexpected event occurred because even though 
the aircraft were broadcasting true position data, the 
ADS-B transmission model was still being used.  The 
transmission model resulted in a slight delay between 
the aircraft’s position at the time of transmitting the 
ADS-B message and the position at the time of 
reception of the ADS-B message by Aircraft B.  This 
delay was present in all scenarios, but this position 
difference was negligible compared to the NACp 
position uncertainty error.  In these two scenarios, 
Aircraft B did not detect a conflict with Aircraft A 
based on the broadcast position, but if instantaneous 
position information were used for Aircraft A, a 
conflict would have been detected.  The small error 
introduced by the movement of Aircraft A between 
transmission and reception of the ADS-B message 
resulted in just enough difference in relation to 
Aircraft B’s position to result in the missed alerts.  
For Aircraft A, all of the missed alerts, for all 
accuracy levels, occurred after the aircraft had 
crossed the runway threshold for landing.  An alert 
was considered a nuisance if it was generated at the 
same time the aircraft was determined to be within 
the nuisance boundary.  Therefore, nuisance alerts for 
Aircraft A only occurred as the aircraft was exiting 
the runway (see explanation above). 
 
Table 5.  Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics by Aircraft for Arrival / Taxi Crossing Runway Scenario 
 
 
NACp 
 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed 
Caution Alerts 
(% runs) 
Missed 
Warning Alerts 
(% runs) 
Nuisance 
Caution Alerts 
(% runs) 
Nuisance 
Warning Alerts 
(% runs) 
Aircraft A 
8 66,276 0.10 5.97 0.01 0.03 
9 56,808 0.02 1.64 0.00 0.01 
10 37,872 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 
11 28,404 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Truth  9,468 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Aircraft B 
8 66,276 1.90 4.34 2.93 2.54 
9 56,808 0.68 0.74 0.00 0.00* 
10 37,872 0.22 0.26 0.00 0.00 
11 28,404 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Truth  9,468 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Only one occurrence 
Unnecessary maneuvering - Previous research 
has shown that pilots instinctively react upon 
receiving airport traffic warning alerts in the flight 
deck [14] without necessarily confirming with 
secondary or additional information first.  It is critical 
that alerting only occurs when needed; otherwise, 
these unnecessary maneuvers can cause delays, 
equipment wear, and other costs to airlines. 
To evaluate this situation, maneuvering was 
considered unnecessary if made based on a warning 
alert issued when the aircraft were broadcasting 
NACp accuracy, but for the same test conditions, a 
warning alert was not issued when broadcasting true 
position data.  This measure quantifies untimely 
nuisance alerts using an algorithm-dependent 
methodology. 
The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft 
maneuvered unnecessarily when using NACp data 
accuracy is shown in Table 6.  Thus, as the accuracy 
decreased, the frequency of occurrences of 
unnecessary maneuvers increased.  With a NACp 
value of 8, approximately 10% or 1 in 10 of the 
warning alerts were unnecessary.  With a NACp 
value of 11, approximately 1 in 1000 warning alerts 
were unnecessary for Aircraft A and 2 in 1000 was 
unnecessary for Aircraft B.  There was no statistical 
difference between accuracy levels when analyzing 
unnecessary maneuvers over all equipage levels. 
Table 6.  Unnecessary Maneuvers by Aircraft 
during Arrival / Taxi Crossing Runway Scenario 
NACp Aircraft A 
(% runs) 
Aircraft B 
(% runs) 
8 10.8 9.5 
9 2.8 3.7 
10 0.3 0.4 
11 0.1 0.2 
 
Collision avoidance – By the design of the 
scenarios, approximately 20% of the runs resulted in 
a near collision (NC) and approximately 10 % 
resulted in collisions (C) in the absence of CD&R, as 
shown in Table 7.  Collision avoidance was 
significantly affected by the CD&R system equipage 
level.  The most collisions were avoided when both 
aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  In some 
instances, CD&R was more effective depending on 
which aircraft was equipped.  For this scenario, more 
collisions were avoided when the crossing traffic 
(Aircraft B) was equipped.  However, when only the 
approach aircraft (Aircraft A) was equipped, collision 
avoidance was less effective, but better that when 
neither aircraft were equipped.  Many collisions were 
unavoidable for the approach aircraft.  The most 
frequent causes were the warning alert occurred 
during high speed rollout or when the aircraft was too 
close to the ground to go around; other times the  
Table 7.  Percentage of Near-Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) for Equipage Combinations for Arrival / 
Taxi Crossing Runway Scenario 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 16,569 19.3 9.3 15.2 6.4 15.8 3.1 10.5 2.6 
9 14,202 19.3 9.3 16.3 7.0 16.6 0.8 9.4 0.5 
10 9,468 19.3 9.3 16.4 7.1 17.2 0.6 10.2 0.2 
11 7,101 19.3 9.3 16.4 7.1 17.5 0.3 10.6 0.1 
Truth 2,367 19.3 9.3 16.5 7.2 17.5 0.3 10.8 0.0 
Table 8.  Unwanted Alert Data for Arrival / Taxi Crossing Runway Scenario 
 
NACp 
 
Total # 
Runs 
Unwanted Caution Unwanted Warning 
% Runs Max dist over hold line
(ft) (mean, st dev) 
% Runs Max dist over hold line 
(ft) (mean, st dev) 
8 66,276       8.9 126.4,   75.3  17.4 147.5,   80.7 
9 56,808       2.1   50.5,   26.4   6.7   55.4,   26.0 
10 37,872       0.1   16.6,   11.2   0.4   24.7,     9.5 
11 28,404       0.0     0.0,     0.0   0.0     0.0,     0.0 
Truth 9,468       0.0     0.0,     0.0   0.0     0.0,     0.0 
collision occurred after the maneuver was initiated 
but before the aircraft started climbing or during 
climb-out or during taxi on the runway.  In some 
instances, the approach aircraft landed, exited the 
runway, and stopped but then the taxiing aircraft 
collided with it.  Position accuracy had little effect on 
collision avoidance, with no statistical difference in 
collision avoidance between position accuracy levels.  
However, there were more collisions when using 
NACp 8 accuracy when either Aircraft B or both 
aircraft were equipped. 
Unwanted alert – As defined above, an alert was 
considered unwanted if the true aircraft position 
(nose) for Aircraft B was behind the hold line but the 
detected position indicated that the aircraft was over 
the hold line, causing an alert.  The frequency of 
unwanted alerts increased as the position accuracy 
decreased, particularly when using NACp 8 accuracy, 
as shown in Table 8.  Also, a larger buffer between 
the hold line and alerting zone is required as the 
position accuracy decreases in order to reduce the 
number of unwanted alerts (see Table 8).  For the 
arrival with taxi crossing scenario, 99 percent of 
unwanted alerts could have been avoided by placing 
the hold line 390 ft from the hold line for NACp 8 
accuracy, 135 ft from the hold line for NACp 9 
accuracy, and 55 ft from the hold line for NACp 10 
accuracy.  The maximum standard for separation 
between the hold line and runway centerline is 280 ft 
[17] to accommodate the largest aircraft.  A 390 ft 
alerting zone buffer is not practical for even the 
largest airports. 
Taxi Scenario – Taxi intersection 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, 76 
combinations of the initiation delay and initial 
location for Aircraft B were evaluated, for a total of 
6,384 test runs. 
Algorithm performance – The data shows (Table 
9) that caution alerts were generated for 55% to 76% 
of the test runs for both aircraft and warning alerts 
were generated for 50% to 66% of the runs.  The 
number of caution and warning alerts for NACp 9 
accuracy was statistically different from NACp 10, 
11 and truth accuracies over all equipage levels. 
As the position accuracy was reduced, alert 
toggling occurred more frequently, especially when 
using NACp 8 and 9 accuracies (see Table 9).  The 
number  of  multiple  caution and  warning  alerts  for  
Table 9.  Alert Statistics by Aircraft for Taxi Intersection Scenario 
 
 
NACp 
 
Total # 
Runs 
 
Caution Alerts 
(% runs) 
Multiple Caution 
Alerts 
(% runs) 
 
Warning Alerts 
(% runs) 
Multiple Warning 
Alerts 
(% runs) 
Aircraft A 
8 2,128 76.6  36.5 66.8  21.1 
9 1,824 70.5  16.3 61.2   3.9 
10 1,216 58.1   3.2 53.7   0.1 
11 912 56.4   0.1 51.4   0.0 
Truth 304 55.6  0.0 50.0   0.0 
Aircraft B 
8 2,128 57.3 14.5 63.8 15.5 
9 1,824 56.5  1.8 57.7  2.1 
10 1,216 55.3  0.0 53.5  0.0 
11 912 56.3  0.0 51.3  0.0 
Truth 304 58.6  0.0 50.0  0.0 
 
Table 10.  Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics by Aircraft for Taxi Intersection Scenario 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# runs, 
% runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length
# runs, 
% runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length
Aircraft A 
8 2128,  100   8.1,    7.8 18.6,  11.0 54.2  703,  33.0   1.8,    1.1 3.4,  5.2   9.6 
9 1339,  73.4   2.2,    1.1   3.1,    4.4  9.2 62,    3.4   1.1,    1.0 1.0,  1.8   2.8 
10   666,  54.8   1.1,    0.9   0.5,    0.3  1.5   0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0    0,  0.0   0.0 
11   327,  35.9   1.0,    1.0   0.3,    0.1  0.8   0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0    0,  0.0   0.0 
Truth       0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0  0.0   0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0    0,  0.0   0.0 
Aircraft B 
8 2128,  100   8.0,    7.5   5.3,    6.1 15.3   674,  31.7   1.9,    1.2 3.8,  5.2 11.1 
9 1124,  61.6   2.2,    1.2   2.7,    3.9  8.2     53,    2.9   1.2,    0.9    0.9,  0.9   2.6 
10   430,  35.4   1.0,    1.0   0.5,    0.3  1.7       0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0       0,  0.0   0.0 
11   197,  21.6   1.0,    1.0   0.3,    0.1  0.9       0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0       0,  0.0   0.0 
Truth       0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0  0.0       0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0       0,  0.0   0.0 
 
NACp 9 accuracy was statistically different from 
NACp 10 and 11 and truth accuracies over all 
equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, the number of 
multiple caution alerts for NACp 9 accuracy was 
statistically different from NACp 10 accuracy; 
furthermore, NACp 10 accuracy was statistically 
different from NACP 11 and truth accuracies over all 
equipage levels. 
Missed and nuisance alerts – For a large 
percentage of test runs, the aircraft entered the 
defined missed boundary for all surveillance 
accuracies, except truth, as shown in Table 10.  The 
aircraft entered the missed boundary for all test runs 
when using NACp 8 accuracy and over 60 percent of 
runs when using NACp 9 accuracy.  The number of 
times (count) and amount of time (duration and 
percentage of run length) that the aircraft were within 
the missed boundary was greater when using less 
accurate data (see Table 10).  This was particularly 
true when using NACp 8 accuracy.  There was a 
Table 11.  Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics by Aircraft for Taxi Intersection Scenario 
 
 
NACp 
 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed 
Caution Alerts 
(% runs) 
Missed 
Warning Alerts 
(% runs) 
Nuisance 
Caution Alerts 
(% runs) 
Nuisance 
Warning Alerts 
(% runs) 
Aircraft A 
8 2,128 5.7 6.5 0.0 0.0 
9 1,824 3.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 
10 1,216 2.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 
11 912 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Truth 304 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B 
8 2,128 5.7 6.5 0.0 0.0 
9 1,824 3.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 
10 1,216 2.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 
11 912 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Truth 304 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
statistically significant difference between NACp 
accuracy when analyzing the number of times 
entering the missed boundary and nuisance boundary 
over all equipage levels.  The post-hoc analysis 
revealed NACp 9 accuracy was statistically different 
from NACp 10 and 11 and truth accuracies.  The 
aircraft entered the missed boundary when both 
crossing the intersecting taxiway and when traveling 
along the taxiway.  As with the previous scenario, the 
high rate of crossing the missed boundary was due to 
the missed boundary definition.  There was no buffer 
between when the aircraft was inside or outside the 
missed boundary; therefore, a very small difference 
between the true and detected position caused a 
missed boundary to be counted.  The aircraft entered 
the nuisance boundary only for NACp 8 and 9 
accuracies.  Since the aircraft’s true taxi path was 
along the taxiway centerline, it was only possible to 
enter the nuisance boundary when crossing the 
intersecting taxiway. 
The number of test runs that contained missed 
alerts increased as the position accuracy decreased, as 
shown in Table 11.  Missed alerts for both aircraft 
were highest when using NACp 8 accuracy (less than 
7 percent of test runs).  There was no statistical 
difference between accuracy levels when analyzing 
missed caution alerts and missed warning alerts over 
all equipage levels.  The rate of missed alerts was the 
same for both aircraft since the aircraft conducted 
identical operations, traveling along and crossing a 
taxiway.  It was only possible for a nuisance alert to 
be generated when taxiing across a taxiway; 
however, there were not any nuisance alerts for either 
aircraft for this test scenario. 
Unnecessary maneuvering - For the test runs in 
which both aircraft were broadcasting NACp 
accuracies and required to maneuver based on a 
warning alert, the percentage of test runs in which the 
aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily is shown in Table 
12.  Thus, as the data accuracy decreased, the 
frequency of occurrences of unnecessary 
maneuvering increased.  With a NACp value of 8, 
over one third of the warning alerts were 
unnecessary.  With a NACp value of 11, less than 3 
in 100 warning alerts were unnecessary for Aircraft 
A and less than 2 in 100 were unnecessary for 
Aircraft B.  There was no statistical difference 
between accuracy levels when analyzing unnecessary 
maneuvers over all equipage levels. 
Table 12.  Unnecessary Maneuvers during Taxi 
Intersection Scenario 
NACp Aircraft A 
(% runs) 
Aircraft B 
(% runs) 
8 38.0 36.8 
9 19.5 14.9 
10 4.6 3.9 
11 2.6 1.8 
 
Table 13.  Percentage of Near-Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) for Equipage Combinations for Taxi 
Intersection Scenario 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 532 50.0 43.4 29.3 20.1 31.6 23.7 23.1 16.9 
9 456 50.0 43.4 28.5 19.5 26.3 16.9 10.7   4.4 
10 304 50.0 43.4 29.6 18.8 21.7 13.8   5.3  1.0 
11 228 50.0 43.4 29.4 18.4 20.2 14.0   2.2  0.0 
Truth 76 50.0 43.4 30.3 18.4 19.7 13.2   2.6  0.0 
Collision avoidance – For this scenario, 
CD&R equipage was effective for collision 
avoidance, as shown in Table 13.  Equipage for either 
aircraft dropped the near collision and collision rates 
in half, and with both aircraft equipped, the near 
collision rate was reduced by an order of magnitude 
and down to a 1% collision rate with NACp 10 
accuracy.  The data shows that more collisions were 
avoided more effectively when both aircraft were 
equipped with CD&R; however, collisions still 
occurred, except when using very accurate data.  
Since both aircraft conducted identical operations, it 
was expected that collision avoidance would be 
similar for both aircraft.  However, collision 
avoidance was slightly more effective when Aircraft 
B was equipped than when Aircraft A was equipped, 
except for NACp 8 accuracy.  Position accuracy did 
not have much effect on collision avoidance, except 
when both aircraft were equipped.  Over all levels of 
NACp accuracy, the differences in the number of 
collisions showed no statistically significant 
difference, when excluding NACp 8 accuracy; 
however, there were significant differences between 
the interaction of NACp accuracy and equipage 
levels.  When only one aircraft was equipped (either 
A or B), there was no statistical difference in the 
number of collisions.  When neither aircraft were 
equipped, there was a significant difference as the 
number of collisions was higher than when only one 
aircraft was equipped.  When both aircraft were 
equipped, there was a significant difference in the 
number of collisions as they were lower than when 
only one aircraft was equipped. 
Preliminary investigation was performed on 
the test runs that resulted in collision for the truth 
data condition.  It was determined that for these test 
runs, warning alerts were generated; however, by the 
time the pilot reaction delay (2 seconds) was over, 
the aircraft was projected to stop closer than 100 ft 
from the intersecting taxiway centerline.  As a result, 
the aircraft continued taxi and a collision occurred. 
Summary 
A CD&R concept for the airport TMA was 
evaluated in a fast-time batch simulation study.  The 
purpose of the study was to evaluate the performance 
of an aircraft-based CD&R algorithm during various 
runway, taxiway, and low altitude scenarios, multiple 
levels of CD&R system equipage, and various levels 
horizontal position accuracy. 
It is critical that alerting does not cause the flight 
crew to make unnecessary maneuvers since these 
actions can cause delays, equipment wear, and other 
costs to airlines.  Results showed that for the 
scenarios reported herein, maneuvers were frequently 
made unnecessarily and were affected by position 
accuracy, with more unnecessary maneuvers 
occurring as position accuracy decreased. 
Alert toggling occurs when multiple instances of 
caution and warning alerts are generated as a result of 
position accuracy or aircraft maneuvering.  Alert 
toggling can be a distraction to the flight crew and 
could cause mistrust in the technology.  In general, 
alert toggling occurred more frequently as the 
position accuracy was reduced, especially for NACp 
8 and NACp 9 accuracy levels. 
Missed alerts represent a reduction in CD&R 
benefits and will result in operations such as they 
currently exist, where CD&R alerts are not provided.  
The occurrence of missed alerts was much higher 
with NACp 8 position accuracy, in general. 
Nuisance alerts could distract the flight crew 
unnecessarily, reduce confidence in the system, and 
can negatively affect safety and operational 
effectiveness.  For the operations in which nuisance 
alerts were possible, the occurrence of nuisance alerts 
was relatively low for the scenarios reported on 
herein. 
In general, collision avoidance was affected by 
the CD&R equipage level.  The most collisions were 
avoided if both aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  
When only one aircraft was equipped with CD&R, 
collision avoidance was more effective depending on 
which aircraft was equipped for the arrival with 
crossing taxi traffic scenario.  CD&R was not 
extremely effective for avoidance of near collisions 
for the arrival with taxi crossing scenario.  
In order to reduce the number of unwanted alerts 
when taxiing across a runway, a buffer is needed 
between the hold line and the alerting zone so alerts 
are not generated when an aircraft is behind the hold 
line.  Testing indicated that as the position accuracy 
decreases, a larger buffer is required.  With NACp 8 
data accuracy, such a large buffer would be required 
that it is not practical. 
Continued analysis of these data is being 
conducted to identify horizontal positional accuracy 
requirements for effective terminal maneuvering area 
CD&R and efficient algorithm designs. 
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